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THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: ECUADOR'S TWENTY YEAR
CRUSADE TO ESTABLISH ENVIRONMENTAL HUMAN
RIGHTS AS CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
ANNIE WILKINSON
In developing governments around the world the lure of economic stimulus entices leaders to
invest in projects that could relieve them of chronic poverty and set their economies on a
trajectory to prosperity. These communities, consisting most often of low-income and minority
demographics, suffer disproportionately from the impacts of hazardous wastes and toxic
chemicals as compared to other communities across the world. In the 1960s, Texaco Petroleum
began extensive exploration and extraction of crude oil in a region of the AmaZon rainforest
fbrmerly inhabited solely by indigenous peoples native to northeastern Ecuador. There is no
dispute the events that took place in the region in the subsequent thirty years caused an
ecological disaster that permanently endangers the indigenous peoples and the once-pristine
region of the Amazon. Agreement on the issues of the environmental catastrophe ends there. In
1993, a group of Ecuadorian plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of the indigenous communities harmed
by Texaco's operations. Texaco argued for the removal of the case to Ecuador whose judiciary,
the company argued, was perfectly capable and more suitable of resolving the dispute. In 2001,
The Chevron Corporation acquired Texaco and their lengthy litigation in Ecuador. In February
2011, Ecuadorian plaintihf obtained an 18 billion dollar .judgment in an Amazon Provincial
Court and suddenly the 'perfectly capable' Ecuadorian.judicial system became a scapegoat and
the avenue of Chevron's appeal to enjoin enforcement of the judgment. This article insists, as a
general theme, that the United States address the inequities of U.S. multi-national corporations'
behavior in communities where there is a substantial need fbr environmental and human rights
protection via the Alien Tort Statute.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The environmental justice movement attempts to address the
inequities of economic development in communities where there is a
substantial need for environmental and human rights protection.' These
'See Judith Kimerling, Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia: The Case of
Ecuador, ChevronTexaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco, 38 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 413 (2006).
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communities, which often consist of low-income and minority
demographics, suffer disproportionately from the impacts of hazardous
wastes and toxic chemicals as compared to other communities across the
world.
During the 1960s, an environmental justice case developed in the
Lago Agrio region of Ecuador. An American multinational corporation
physically invested itself in the developing nation of Ecuador, whose
government was weakened by tyranny and poverty. The American
corporation befriended Ecuador's government, contracted with it to pursue
fossil fuel exploration and extraction, and conducted its business pursuits
without counsel or representation from the indigenous inhabitants of the
region. Over the next thirty years, the population of the Lago Agrio region
declined as its inhabitants suffered widespread health problems and
experienced only brief periods of relief from the debilitating poverty that
the government had earlier leveraged to galvanize support for partnering
with the corporation.
Frequently marginalized in regard to environmental policy and
regulatory enforcement, the vulnerable inhabitants of developing nations
such as Ecuador are left without a voice or a vote.2 Their fates therefore rest
in the hands of their governments, which seek economic development
funds by providing advantages to corporations in resource-rich areas
around the world via cheap labor and limited environmental regulations.
This article argues that legitimizing the plight of exploited
communities like Lago Agrio, Ecuador requires the United States to hold
parties accountable for the environmental torts committed in foreign
jurisdictions. Additionally, this article argues that this goal can only be
effectively achieved via legal obligations, enforceable through judicial
bodies, rather than relying on unenforceable frameworks driven by
voluntary business agreements.
The residents of Lago Agrio, who reside in a once-pristine area of
the Amazon, recently began a contentious new stage of appeals in their
ongoing litigation against one of the largest American corporations: the
Chevron Corporation. Chevron, previously willing to submit to the
2 Referring to the lack of informed consent by the Indigenous Peoples in Ecuador, a principle
enumerated in the United Nations' Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, discussed
infra Part IV B (2)(b).
Referring to the deregulation and lack of oversight regarding environmental practices by
multinational corporations in a foreign nation and relying on the corporations themselves to "do
the right thing," simply does not work. See Kimerling, supra note 1, at 419.
Chevron Corporation merged with Texaco in 2001. For the purposes of this paper, the
operations taking place prior to the merger will also be referred to as that of [Chevron] as the
dispute of the merger divesting Chevron of liability for the prior acts is beyond the scope of this
paper. For background on the dispute surrounding the merger, see Chevron Corp. v Naranjo, 2011
WL 4375022 (2d Cir. 2011).
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jurisdiction of Ecuadorian courts, now asserts due process injustice after an
Ecuadorian court's February 2011 multibillion-dollar judgment in favor of
the indigenous plaintiffs.' The current environmental and health conditions
that the plaintiffs face necessitate enforcement of the judgment and prompt
environmental remediation.
Typically, when defendants default on judgment obligations
stemming from tort proceedings, their assets are attached or seized to
satisfy the judgment's financial obligations. Because Chevron has no assets
left in Ecuador to attach to satisfy the judgment, recovery is unlikely
without the judicial intervention of the United States. The United States has
jurisdiction over Chevron's assets and a domestic legal framework to
enforce international judgments. The Ecuadorian plaintiffs have obtained a
judgment in a once-mutually accepted forum but cannot enforce that
judgment due to procedural inefficiencies in the legal framework that
regulates the recognition of foreign judgments. The lack of enforcement of
foreign judgments creates arduous circumstances for foreign plaintiffs that
have included years of litigation in the pursuit of recovery.
More than 200 years ago, U.S. legislative leaders foresaw similar
situations as threats to national security and trade. They attempted to
construct a framework to alleviate the quandary of domestic enforcement
of international judgments altogether by providing that a U.S. District
Court would serve as the forum for arbitration. In 1789, Congress enacted
the Alien Tort Statute,6 which provides foreign plaintiffs the jurisdiction of
the United States. In its infancy, the nation sought to prevent disfavor that
could possibly lead to military conflict by extending foreign plaintiffs a
judicial forum for torts committed abroad, either in violation of a treaty of
the United States or in violation of a limited list of universally condemned
offenses.' This article contends that any tortious party operating under the
laws of the United States should be held accountable for tortious
environmental destruction that results in severe human rights violations
because they should be included within the universally condemned offenses
under the Alien Tort Statute.
Aguinda II, infra note 49.
6 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) provides, "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
Originally, the ATS included the offenses of piracy and kidnapping of ambassadors. See
Carolyn A. D'Amore, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Alien Tort Statute: How Wide Has the
Door to Human Rights Litigation Been Left Open?, 39 AKRON. L. REV. 593, 596 (2006); William
R. Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the
Law of Nations, I8 CONN. L. REV. 467,479-80 (1986).
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Part I of this article discusses the Lago Agrio region of Ecuador
before and after the discovery of oil in the early sixties and the
environmental legacy of Chevron in Ecuador. Part II examines the two
decades of litigation surrounding the misconduct of Chevron, the
multibillion-dollar judgment for the plaintiffs in February 2011, and
Chevron's subsequent appeals to effectively render the judgment
unenforceable.
Part III analyzes pertinent case law of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)
as an alternative theory for recovery. First, non-environmental ATS cases
that provide fundamental interpretations of the statute are identified. Next,
case law is used to dispute the Second Circuit's decision in Kiobel v Royal
Dutch Petroleum,' which held that multinational corporations are not
proper defendants under the statute. This decision is inconsistent with case
law and the congressional intent of the statute. Part III also evaluates
pertinent environmental ATS case law that is potentially favorable to
environmental human rights plaintiffs. Part IV draws on the Ninth
Circuit's conclusion that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) provisions meet the standard of customary international
law and argues that recognizing environmental human rights as customary
international law is the next step in the evolution of ATS environmental
case law. Once the courts recognize environmental human rights as
customary international law under the ATS, the plaintiffs in this case could
prevail under this course of action.
II. PARADISE LOST: THE RAINFOREST, THE KICHWA, AND BIG OIL
A. The Significance of the Lago Agrio Region and the Kichwa
The northeast corner of Ecuador, an area roughly the size of Rhode
Island, remains the home of some of the planet's most bio-diverse
ecosystems as well as of thousands of indigenous peoples who have been in
the region for millennia.' Prior to 1964, this region was entirely unexplored
and inhabited only by indigenous tribes.' 0 Ecuador is one of only seventeen
nations known collectively as mega-diversity countries, which contain
more than two-thirds of the world's biological wealth. This biological
diversity is inextricably connected and essential to the existence and quality
of human life, and is reflected in the wealth of life in Lago Agrio." Today,
' Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010). "Corporations -- in
contrast to individuals -- may not be held liable under the ATS for violations of international
law." Id. at 177.
9 See ALLEN GERLACH, INDIANS, OIL, AND POLITICS: A RECENT HISTORY OF ECUADOR (2003).
'o Aguinda 1, infra note 26.
'1 See KRISHNA R. DRONAMRAJU. Biological Wealth and Other Essays, World Scientific (2010)
14 Vol. XI:2
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the indigenous in Ecuador are searching for a sustainable way to coexist in
a society that prioritizes economic development.12
B. The Discovery of Black Gold
Below the surface of the Amazon jungle lie reserves of crude oil
and natural gas, the ever-growing demand for which threatens the
environment and the indigenous communities therein. In 1964, after
receiving reports of oil surfacing in the Lago Agrio region of eastern
Ecuador, the Government of Ecuador invited a Texaco subsidiary, Texaco
Petroleum Company (TPC), and Gulf Oil to investigate and extract the
oil. 3 The following year, TPC started operating a petroleum concession for
a consortium owned in equal shares by TPC and Gulf Oil Corporation.14
Industrial-scale natural resource extraction began in the mid-
sixties.s Ecuador initiated a plethora of development projects aimed at
relieving the nation from the bonds of chronic poverty. During the early
years of fossil fuel exploration and extraction, the Ecuadorian Government
developed an amicable relationship with the Texaco Corporation that
extended as far as allowing the company free-range of control of its
operations and the building of infrastructure to achieve successful oil
production and refinery."
The oil company brought promises of economic prosperity to
Ecuador, whose economy relied primarily on the export of bananas.
Poverty-relieving development and infrastructure investments fueled
nationalist sentiments and as a result, the government of Ecuador created
PetroEcuador, the National Ecuadorian oil and natural gas industry. The
government also implemented oil-friendly legislation to continue the
development of oil and to portray to foreign investors that the country as a
worthy candidate for economic developments funds.'9 Although the
" See Paul M. Barrett, Amazon Crusader. Chevron Pest. Fraud?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK,
(Mar. 09, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/l 112/b4220056636512.htm.
" Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 334, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
4 Id. at 334.
" Id.
" Briefing Paper, Amazon Watch, Understanding Recent Developments in the Landmark
Chevron-Ecuador Case (Spring 2012), http://amazonwatch.org/assets/files/Chevron-Ecuador-
Briefing- Spring-2012.pdf.
' Megan S. Chapman, Seeking Justice in Lago Agrio and Beyond: An Argument fbrJoint
Responsibility of Host States and Foreign Investors befbre the Regional Human Rights' Systems,
18 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 6 (2010).
m Id. at 10.
" Judith Kimerling , Interview with Mariana Acosta, Executive Director, Foundations For a New
World in Quito, Ecuador (Mar. 3, 1994).
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government procured development funds using expanded oil exploration
and discovery as collateral, the promise of an exodus from poverty has
never been realized. PetroEcuador became the majority owner of the Lago
Agrio consortium in 1976, and Ecuador's political leaders maintained a
friendly stance toward Texaco/Chevron to keep it in Ecuador. 20
C. The Environmental Human Rights Legacy
In the United States, impact assessments and procedural protocol
designed to protect the natural environment from catastrophic
contamination of resources used by humans are standard practice for any
oil exploration or extraction project.2' Oil extraction typically begins with a
well dug deep into the earth. Pits are created for temporary storage of
wastes, such as excess oil run-off, wastewater, and toxic chemicals used
with project machinery.22 These temporary storage pits are lined with
environmentally safe industrial tarps, which function as highly resistant
shields that prevent the ground from absorbing any toxic contaminants.
While engineers and other employees extract oil, the wastewater (or
"production fluids," as it is known in the industry) is stored in these lined
pits while the crude is sent to the "separation station" for the refining
process. Once the project has been completed, the toxic sludge is disposed
of and the wastewater is piped deep into the ground, after which the well is
closed and surroundings are restored to their natural state.23
Evidence that the Texaco Corporation used these environmental
impact protections is manifest in its U.S operations in place at the time.24
Texaco had even patented a new reinjection technology aimed at reducing
seepage of toxic wastewater, a clear demonstration of its knowledge of the
dangerous outcomes of ground absorption.25 In Ecuador, however, Texaco
did not follow these procedures that were standard in the United States.
Texaco directed its production fluids from its wells into open pits rather
than re-injecting the toxic fluids back underground.26 This fact is not in
dispute.27 Moreover, the sludge created from the separation process of
20 id.
" Council on Envtl Quality, Executive Office of the President, Review of MMS's NEPA
Procedures Following the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/nepa/mms-review (2010).
22 Id. at 14.
23 Id. at 15, 16.
24 Kimerling, supra note 1, at 419-422.
25 Id. at 433-436.
26 Aguinda v. Texaco, (Aguinda 1), 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
27 Id. at 535.
16 Vol. XI:2
THE HEALTH OF NATIONS
crude and water was not properly disposed of, resulting in mass
accumulation of toxic solid waste throughout northeast Ecuador.28
Environmental scientists have determined that the production fluids
were heavy in cancer-causing causing chemicals including benzene and
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and are responsible for present-
day contamination of the regional water supply, a water supply used by the
Kichwas for hundreds or thousands of years. 29 Exploration and extraction
operations are estimated to have discharged twenty-six million gallons of
crude oil and toxic wastewater into the surrounding environment.o While
there has been a wide array of accusations of faulty tests, reports and
scientific analyses sponsored by both the plaintiffs and defendants show a
minimum of a 150% increase in cancer cases in the region since 1980. As a
result, many of Ecuador's indigenous groups have suffered irreversible
damage to their native lands, the erosion of their cultural heritage, and a
myriad of health complications, which threaten their continued existence.31
Damage to female reproductive organs has thinned birthrates among
indigenous tribes. Chevron, while insisting that no causal link between oil
operations and cancer rates can be substantiated by evidence of cancer rates
increasing generally in the last thirty years, does not deny these past
32practices.
For three decades, the oil entrepreneurs pursued and achieved
unparalleled profits, partially from the Lago Agrio crude operations.
Chevron's operations have left the rainforest floor stained with toxic waste
pits and streams laced with verified carcinogens. Local indigenous and
farming communities face a public health crisis consisting of, among
others, increased cancer rates, brain damage, liver and kidney damage,
respiratory problems, and reproductive problems in women. 3 4 These human
rights violations resulting from severe environmental destruction will
28 Id. at 535.
29 PAHs occur in oil, coal, and tar deposits, and are produced as byproducts of fuel burning
(whether fossil fuel or biomass). As a pollutant, they are of concern because some compounds
have been identified as carcinogenic, mutagenic, and teratogenic. See Imre Szeman, Crude
Aesthetics: The Politics of Oil Documentaries, 46 J. AM. ST. 442 (2012).
3o Aguinda II, infra note 54.
3' Richard Cabrera, Global Damages Expert for the Court of Nueva Loja, Technical Summary
Report, (reporting on shortened life expectancy, high infant mortality rates, and uterine and
ovarian genetic illnesses) available at http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/cabrera-english-
2008.pdf.
3 Chapman, supra note 17, at 14.
3 Aguinda 1, 945 F. Supp. 625.
3 See ChevronToxico, Chevron's Human Rights Record,
http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/chevron-human-rights-record.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
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eradicate the Kichwa unless necessary funds are immediately allocated to
environmental remediation.s
III. LITIGATION HISTORY
A. Aguinda v. Texaco: United States not an Appropriate Forum
In 1993, a class-action lawsuit on behalf Ecuadorian citizens
affected by the destruction of the Lago Agrio region was filed in the
District Court for the Southern District of New York. 36 The suit sought
compensatory damages for the allegedly reckless extraction operations that
resulted in severe environmental contamination of the Ecuadorian rain
forest between 1964 and 1992. Chevron promptly moved to dismiss the
Aguinda action on a number of grounds, most pertinently forum non
conveniens. Chevron argued that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and their claims
were bodies of International Law. Customary International Law demands
that the plaintiffs exhaust all remedies in Ecuadorian Courts, which
Chevron asserted were an appropriate forum for the litigation.37
The district court agreed that private citizens did have the right to
recover for environmental damage to public lands and that Chevron should
to submit to the jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian courts. The court dismissed
the action under the forum non conveniens doctrine, and the Second Circuit
affirmed.3' Following this dismissal, the next decade and a half of
contentious litigation in and out of United States' courts, Ecuadorian
courts, and International Tribunals, fulfilled the prophecy of the drafters of
the Alien Tort Statute.
Forum non conveniens allows a court, on a motion from the
defendants, to defer jurisdiction to another court on matters where there is a
more appropriate forum available to adjudicate the issues in dispute. 39 The
grant or denial of the motion is generally committed under the court's
broad discretion and the defendant bears the burden of proof on all
elements of the analysis. 40 The defendant has the burden of showing: (1)
the existence of an adequate alternative forum, and (2) the balance of
private and public interest factors favors dismissal.41 Colloquially referred
to as the "Gilbert Factors," public interest factors to be considered include:
3 Chapman, supra note 17, at 10.
31 945 F. Supp. 625.
3 Id.
38 id.
3 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981).
4o Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 510, 2002 WL 587224 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 965 F. Supp. 899, 902 (S.D. Tex. 1996), affd, 113 F.3d 540 (5th
Cir. 1997).
41 Piper, 454 U.S. at 254; Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
18s Vol. XI:2
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court congestion; the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum
with jury duty; the interest in having localized controversies decided at
home; the interest in trying the case in a forum familiar with the applicable
law; and the interest in avoiding unnecessary conflicts of laws.42 However,
the court's analysis is generally committed to assessing the cognizability of
the suit in the proffered jurisdiction and whether or not the defendant is
amenable to process.43
In Aguinda I, the court's grant of dismissal on forum non
conveniens relied on the defendants' acceptance and acquiescence to the
jurisdiction of Ecuadorian courts, and the fact that the torts were committed
in Ecuador and thus more appropriately adjudicated under Ecuadorian
laws. The plaintiffs argued that an Ecuadorian court would not have the
means of enforcing a judgment should one be obtained. However, the court
decided that, because the United States has legislation that recognizes
foreign money judgments, the plaintiffs could seek redress in the United
States at a later date in the event of Chevron defaulting on a judgment
made by an Ecuadorian court. Thus, the merits of the dispute would be
heard in an Ecuadorian court.
B. The Lago Agrio Litigation: A Brief Moment of Triumph
In 2003, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs, consisting of some Aguinda I
plaintiffs as well as additional indigenous peoples, brought the litigation
against Chevron in the Sucumbios Provincial Court in Ecuador, the
epicenter of the destruction. The plaintiffs' arguments were based on
articles of the Ecuadorian Constitution45  and the Environmental
Management Law of 1999, which granted the right to recover damages for
environmental degradation and the resulting harm to human beings and
biodiversity.' The plaintiffs sought "elimination and removal of
12 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
Piper, 454 U.S. at 255.
Aguinda II, infra note 49, af'd, Aguinda III, infra note 51.
CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR arts. 23, 86-88, 90-91
(guaranteeing citizens the right to live in a healthy environment, declaring that environmental
protection and the preservation of biodiversity are in the public interest, requiring public
consultation and approval of decisions that affect the environment, requiring the government to
regulate the production, distribution, and use of substances dangerous to human life and the
environment, and placing responsibility for environmental damage occurring during the delivery
of public services upon the government).
4 Plaintiffs' Complaint Addressed to the President of the Superior Court of Justice of Nueva Loja
(Lago Agrio), Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., Superior Court of Justice of Nueva Loja (Lago
Agrio), No. 002-2003 (filed May 7, 2003) (Ecuador) [hereinafter Lago Agrio Complaint].
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contaminating elements that persist in the region, healthcare for the
inhabitants, and the repair of environmental damages."' In addition, the
complaint sought ten percent of the cost of remediation work to be paid to
Frente de Defensa de la Amazonia (The Amazon Defense Fund). 48
On February 14, 2011, the Ecuadorian provincial court issued a
comprehensive opinion adjudicating the case and entering judgment in
United States dollars against Chevron. The total compensation for damages
amounted to $8.646 billion, an amount that would be doubled if Chevron
did not issue a statement of responsibility and regret within 90 days.49
Chevron issued a statement via their website that stated the judgment "Is
illegitimate because of documented evidence of fraud and unethical action
by the plaintiffs' lawyers as well as the Ecuadorian government and
judiciary."50 Needless to say, they did not issue the apology and the
judgment therefore sits at nearly $18 billion.5' Rather than acknowledging
any responsibility, Chevron filed sixteen separate lawsuits in the United
States and invoked the arbitration clause of the Bilateral Investment Treaty
between the U.S. and Ecuador.
Chevron immediately appealed this judgment to the Appellate
Court of Sucumbfos Province, which denied their 193-page appeal. The
appeal consisted of arguments surrounding a 1995 "Release" Agreement
that Chevron procured from the former President of Ecuador,52 in exchange
for full remediation of the affected region.53 Chevron also claimed that
4 Id. at 22-25. The Plaintiffs' claims with respect to "elimination and removal of contaminating
elements" included requests for removal, treatment and disposition of contaminants in waste pits,
the removal of contaminants from all waterways, the removal of all structures and equipment in
the vicinity of closed wells and facilities, and the "clearance of the terrains, plantations, crops,
streets, roads and buildings where there may still exist contaminating residuals produced or
generated as a consequence of the operations directed by Texaco, including the contaminating
debris deposits built as a part of the wrongly environmental cleaning tasks."
4 1 d. at 24.
4 Superior Court of Nueva Loja, 14/2/2011, "Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco" (Aguinda 1l), 2003-
0002 (Ecuador), available at http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2011-02-14-Aguinda-v-
ChevronTexaco-judgement-English.pdf.
5o The Fraudulent Case Against Chevron, available at
http://www.chevron.com/ecuador/patternoffraud/ (last visited July 26, 2013)
s5 Provincial Court of Sucumbios, 3/1/2012, "Republica del Ecuador v. Chevron" (Aguinda III),
2011-0106 (Ecuador), 2012 WL 7745068, Case No. 2011-1150, available at
http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2012-01-03-appeal-decision-english.pdf.
52 Sixto Alfonso Durin-Ballkn Cordovez, Presidente del Ecuador, 1992-96. Cordovez was an
American-born Ecuadorian who became President and supported competitive markets and
reducing the government's deficit. He is a well-known supporter of Chevron's presence in
Ecuador. See Amazon Defense Coalition, Texaco's Sham Remediation Efbrts of Contamination
at Well Sites (Mar. 2011), http:chevrontoxico.com/news-and-multimedia.html (last visited Feb. 5,
2012). See generally, http://www.chevron.com/news/press/release/?id=2009-09-23 (last visited
July 26, 2013).
Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 419 (2d Cir. 2011). See also Simon
Romero & Clifford Krauss, Ecuador Judge Orders Chevron to Pai $9 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
20 Vol. XI:2
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Ecuador lacked personal jurisdiction and doubted the competency of the
lower judge.54 Chevron maintains that responsibility for damage and
cleanup now lies with PetroEcuador and the government. It contends that
the present damage comes from PetroEcuador activities since 1990,
including spills from a pipeline system built by the consortium that
PetroEcuador has not maintained.' The damage for which Chevron has
taken responsibility is mitigated, according to Chevron, by the acquisition
of their enterprise by PetroEcuador.
C. Chevron's Efforts to Stay Enforcement of the Judgment
After its appeal in Ecuador failed, Chevron filed suit in the United
States and internationally to stay the enforcement of the multibillion-dollar
judgment obtained against them. First, Chevron filed a Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) suit against attorney Steven
R. Donziger in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. Second, Chevron filed with the International Arbitration
Tribunal, the forum set out in a U.S./Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty
(BIT),5 6 seeking injunctive relief on grounds that corruption of proceedings
tainted the entire trial and that Ecuador lacked jurisdiction in violation of
International Law. In both cases, Chevron argued that the judgment should
be universally enjoined.
1. Chevron Corp v. Donziger:7 Chevron Appeals Enforcement
Domestically
15, 2011, at A4, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/world/americas/ 5ecuador.html.
* Aguinda II, No. 21101-2011-0106, at 10.
- Id. at 13.
56 The Bilateral Investment Treaty falls under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention"), which governs
agreements that are "commercial and not entirely between citizens of the United States. The New
York Convention promotes the enforcement of arbitral agreements in contracts involving
international commerce so as to facilitate international business transactions.
7 Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp.2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). It is important to note that
this case against Mr. Donziger was one of sixteen cases filed in Federal Courts, setting forth the
same corruption, fraud, and misuse of justice system arguments to accomplish enjoining the
judgment. Most are pending. See Santiago Cueto, Ecuador Class Action Plaintiffs Strike Back at
Chevron's Cynical Game of Musical Jurisdictions, INT'L BUS. L. ADVISOR, Jan. 18, 2010, http://
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Under U.S. law and the principles of international comity, a
judgment obtained in a foreign court will be recognized in the United
States on substantially identical terms without rehearing the substance of
the original lawsuit." Reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments provides
accommodation and a predictable framework for all parties involved. After
a foreign judgment is recognized, the judgment creditor can seek
enforcement in the recognizing country. Monetary judgments are treated as
though they were obtained in the recognizing jurisdiction meaning that the
creditor has all of the enforcement remedies as one would have if the case
had originated in the recognizing country. For the Ecuadorian plaintiffs,
this means the fact that Chevron removed all of their assets from Ecuador
does not preclude them from recovery. Chevron's assets in the United
States can also be attached to satisfy the judgment.
There are limitations on this recognition under U.S. law, however.
The several exceptions to the enforcement of the foreign judgments were
the predicate of sixteen lawsuits filed by Chevron in the United States. The
United States will not recognize judgments obtained in a variety of
manners, including those obtained by fraud, in violation of due process, or
when the plaintiffs agreed under contract to arbitrate similar disputes in an
identified tribunal that was not the tribunal that ordered the judgment."
Chevron filed suit against Steven R. Donziger, the plaintiff's attorney,
alleging accusations of wrongdoing and fraud, including lying to
investigators and presenting false evidence by Donziger and the indigenous
plaintiffs and asked the Court to enjoin the judgment.60 Chevron,
attempting to use the Act's exceptions offensively, sought mandatory
injunctions globally because the judgment was rendered under a system
which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures which are
www.internationalbusinesslawadvisor.com/2010/01/articles/international-litigation/ecuador-class-
action-plaintiffs-strike-back-at-chevrons-cynical-game-of-musical-jurisdictions (last visited Oct.
5,2012).
-5 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 149 (1986), §§ 1-3
[hereinafter U.M.J.R.A.].
9 See Id. §4(a): "A foreign judgment is not conclusive if: the judgment was rendered under a
system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law; the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant; or the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter." See also §4(b):
"a foreign judgment need not be recognized if: the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign
court did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him or her to defend;
the judgment was obtained by fraud; the cause of action or claim for relief on which the judgment
is based is repugnant to the public policy of the state; the judgment conflicts with another final
and conclusive judgment; the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement
between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled or otherwise than by
proceedings in that court; or in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign
court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action."
6o Donziger, 768 F. Supp.2d at 590.
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compatible with the requirements of due process of law and because the
judgment was obtained fraudulently. In a press release, Chevron declared,
"Lawyers falsified data and pressured scientific experts to "find
contamination" where none existed," and further exerted that, "The
plaintiffs' lawyers also procured the appointment of a supposedly neutral
"global expert" who was recruited and paid by the plaintiffs' lawyers to
pass off as his own a damages report ghostwritten by the plaintiffs' other
consultants."62
Judge Kaplan, writing for the U.S. District Court found the
evidence of fraud and deceit on the part of Donziger to be compelling and
said, "Public policy weighed in favor of issuing the preliminary injunction
barring enforcement.63 The preliminary injunction prohibited residents from
enforcing or preparing to enforce a potential Ecuadorian judgment against a
United States corporation anywhere outside of the Republic of Ecuador.
With no Chevron assets left in the country and therefore disqualifying
attachment as a means of satisfying the judgment, Ecuador appealed to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals urging the necessity of recognition in the
U.S.
On appeal, the Second Circuit chastised the lower court for
granting a global injunction and reprimanded Judge Kaplan as well as
vacated the injunction and stayed the proceedings in the District Court until
further review, which came on January 26, 2012.64 The Second Circuit
concluded that judgment-debtors can challenge a foreign judgment's
validity under the Recognition Act only defensively, in response to an
attempted enforcement, an effort that the Ecuadorians had not yet
undertaken anywhere and might never undertake in New York.65 They
formally reversed the District Court's decision, vacated the injunction, and
remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss Chevron's
declaratory judgment claim in its entirety.
2. International Arbitral Tribunal Grants Interim Award Enjoining the
Judgment
6' Id.
62 See Chevron appeals Ecuador Judgment,
http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/03112011_chevronappealsecuadorjudgme
nt.news (last visited July 26, 2013).
63 Id.
' Chevron Corp. v Donziger, 2012 WL 858768 (2d Cir. 2012).6
5Id.
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Under the threat of U.S. enforcement, Chevron then sought
injunctive relief again through the quasi-offensive use of an exception
under the Uniform Money-Judgments Recognition Act-this time in an
international forum. Since the Act can only be used defensively under U.S.
law, Chevron sought an issue that could be determined elsewhere and
provide a stay of enforcement that the U.S. would be required to recognize
ahead of any future petition filed to recognize the judgment obtained in
Ecuador.
The Uniform Money-Judgments Recognition Act states that a
judgment need not be recognized if the parties previously agreed to
arbitrate like disputes in an identified forum.66 Chevron asserted that the
arbitration clause in a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between the U.S.
and the Republic of Ecuador governed such disputes as this. The Republic
of Ecuador agreed to the arbitration, which resulted in a less favorable
determination of the plaintiffs' case. On February 16, 2012, per the
Bilateral Investment Treaty signed by the U.S and Ecuador, an
International Arbitral body determined that the Republic of Ecuador must
"Take all measures necessary to suspend or cause to be suspended the
enforcement and recognition within and without Ecuador of the $18 billion
judgment. They also ordered the Republic not to certify the $18 billion
judgment, which would permit the Ecuadorean plaintiffs to enforce it
internationally .' The panel found procedural as well as substantive merit in
Chevron's arguments that urgency exists in staying the enforcement of the
judgment that Chevron alleged, "may have irreparable harm on the
corporation under the veil of corruption and conspiracy charges against the
Lago Agrio proceedings." 69 The panel then claimed jurisdiction over the
dispute in its entirety because of the BIT between the United States and
Ecuador.o
While the international tribunal's interim award is discouraging for
the plaintiffs, it is not a death knell. It does, however, ensure the litigation
will continue for many more years. The plaintiffs' next course of action
will be to petition for the enforcement of the multi-billion dollar judgment,
which will undoubtedly involve seeking to demonstrate the injustice of the
investment treaty pursuant to which Ecuador's foreign direct investment is
governed. If the plaintiffs can show that the agreement authorizing the use
of an international arbitral tribunal is in violation of well-established
66 U.M.J.R.A., supra note 58, at § 4(b)(5).
7 Chevron (U.S. v. Ecuador), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 2009-23 (2012), available at
http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/ecuador/SecondTribunallnterimAward.pdf.
61 Id. at 1-5.
69 Id. at 5.
71 Id. at 6. International Arbitration is the stated dispute body of the BIT between the U.S and
Ecuador.
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international law, they can diminish the tribunal's award to merely an
extension of that injustice. The degree of complexity and interplay between
domestic and international legal principles has rendered the plaintiffs
restless and underscores the importance of using the Alien Tort Statute as a
possible mechanism for relief.
IV. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS
For almost 200 years after its passage in 1789, the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) lay virtually dormant with the exception of two cases: one
maritime case adjudicating a property dispute and one child abuse case.7 1
The long period of silence made interpretation of the ATS difficult and
ever-evolving. To secure relief under the ATS, a plaintiff must show that a
tort was committed in violation of a treaty of the United States, or in
violation of the law of nations.72 The statute does not indicate who is a
proper defendant under the statute; it merely states that an alien may bring
the action in U.S federal courts.73 For the reasons discussed below, the
Lago Agrio plaintiffs face significant hurdles under ATS jurisprudence.'
A. Forum Non-Conveniens
Forum non conveniens is a doctrine of the conflict of laws. It
allows a court, on a motion from the defendants, to defer jurisdiction to
another court on matters where there is a more appropriate forum available
to adjudicate the issues in dispute. 5 The grant or denial of the motion is
generally committed under the court's broad discretion, and the defendant
bears the burden of proof on all elements of the analysis. The defendant
has the burden of showing: (1) the existence of an adequate alternative
forum, and (2) the balance of private and public interest factors favors
dismissal. Known as the "Gilbert Factors," public interest factors to be
considered include: court congestion; the unfairness of burdening citizens
in an unrelated forum with jury duty; the interest in having localized
1 See, e.g., Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 811 (D.C.D.S.C. 1795); Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp.
857, 865 (D. Md. 1961).
72 28 U.S. C. § 1350 (2006).
7. id.
7 Justin Lu, Jurisdiction over Non-State Activity under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 35 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 531,535-37 (1997).
7 Piper, 454 U.S. at 254.
6 Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 2002 WL 587224 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2002); Torres v. S. Peru
Copper Corp., 965 F. Supp. 899, 902 (S.D. Tex. 1996), affd, 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997).
7 Piper, 454 U.S. at 254; Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
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controversies decided at home; the interest in trying the case in a forum
familiar with the applicable law; and the interest in avoiding unnecessary
conflicts of laws." The court's analysis is generally focused on assessing
the cognizability of the suit in the proffered jurisdiction and whether the
defendant is amenable to process .79 The Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft
Co. v Reyno reemphasized the Gilbert factors and paid special attention to
the "interest in having localized controversies decided at home."so
In Aguinda I, the court's grant of dismissal on forum non
conveniens relied on the defendants' acceptance and acquiescence to the
jurisdiction of Ecuadorian courts and the fact that the torts were committed
in Ecuador and thus more appropriately adjudicated under Ecuadorian
laws. The plaintiffs argued that an Ecuadorian court would not have the
means of enforcing a judgment against the U.S. corporation should one be
obtained. Chevron had no assets to levy inside of Ecuador. However, the
court ruled that because the United States has legislation that recognizes
foreign money judgments, in the event that Chevron defaults, Ecuador was
deemed a more proper forum. The merits of the dispute would be heard in
an Ecuadorian court, and the Alien Tort Statute would be of no use to them.
B. Non-Environmental A TS Litigation
1. Determining the Scope of the Statute
a. Filartiga v Pena-Irala8 1
The statute created a split of interpretations in the debate over
whether the statute is purely jurisdictional or, alternatively, confers both
jurisdiction and a cause of action for alleged violations of international
law.82 Debate emerged with the interpretation of the statute in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala,3 in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
broadened the analysis concerning actionable claims by aliens and citizens
alike for damages incurred for human rights violations.8 In this case,
neither plaintiff nor defendant were U.S. citizens.
Dolly Fildrtiga and her younger brother Joelito lived in Asuncion,
Paraguay, with their parents. Their father, Dr. Joel Fildrtiga, was a well-
known physician, painter, and opponent of Latin America's "most durable
8 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
1 Piper, 454 U.S. at 255.
soId. at 249-253.
81 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
12 See Lorelle Londis, The Corporate Face of the Alien Tort Claims Act: How an Old Statute
Mandates a New Understanding of Global Interdependence, 57 ME. L. REV. 141, 150 (2005).
a Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 877-879.
Id. at 880.
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dictator," General Alfredo Stroessner. In 1976, 17-year-old Joelito was
abducted and later tortured to death by Americo Norberto Pefia-Irala, the
inspector general in the Department of Investigation for the Police of
Asuncion. Dolly Fihirtiga was forced out of her house in the middle of the
night to view her brother's mutilated body. The District Court ultimately
granted Pena's motion to dismiss the complaint and allowed his return to
Paraguay, ruling that, although the proscription of torture had become a
universally recognized norm, the court was bound to follow appellate
precedents, which narrowly limited the function of international law only to
relations between states.
The Second Circuit reversed the District Court's holding, and the
jurisprudential significance was two-fold. The decision held that a non-
state actor could be prosecuted for a human rights violation under the ATS.
In addition, the Court held that customary international law is evolving and
may include violations of human rights that did not exist when the statute
was written.
The decision was precedent for claims involving an increasing number
of internationally recognized rights, including freedom from torture,
slavery, genocide, and cruel and inhuman treatment. 5 International human
rights experts in this country and abroad have embraced the decision, and
since the landmark decision, courts have been awarding compensatory
damages to victims of human rights abuses committed in violation of the
law of nations.86
In the years after Filartiga, plaintiffs invoked the ATS in federal courts
to sue persons responsible for such international human rights violations as
torture, disappearances, summary execution, genocide, cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment, arbitrary detention, and crimes against humanity.87
There was much controversy among the circuits." The Second Circuit's
approach to what constituted a violation of the law of nations, under
Filartiga, was, "not as it was in 1789 but as it has evolved and exists
among the nations of the world today."
" Id.
6 Pauline Abadie, A New Story of David and Goliath: The Alien Tort Claims Act Gives Victims of
Environmental Injustice in the Developing World a Viable Claim Against Multinational
Corporations, 34 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 745, 749-751 (2004).
" Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (ND Cal. 1987); Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond
Co. Ltd., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995);
Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th
Cir. 1996).
" See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,776 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (terrorist attack by
PLO on Israeli bus, killing 34 and wounding 87; Court refused to apply broad analysis of
Filartiga).
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b. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain89
Modem ATS applicable law was promulgated in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain. Alvarez brought a claim under the ATS for arbitrary arrest and
detention.9 o Alvarez had been indicted in the United States for torturing and
murdering a DEA officer.9 ' When the United States was unable to secure
Alvarez's extradition, it paid Sosa, a Mexican national, to kidnap Alvarez
and bring him into the United States.92 Alvarez claimed that his "arrest" by
Sosa was arbitrary because the warrant for his arrest only authorized his
arrest within the United States. 93 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that Alvarez's abduction constituted arbitrary arrest
in violation of international law.94
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court clarified that the ATS did
not create a cause of action, but instead it merely "furnished jurisdiction for
a relatively modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of
nations." 5 The Court compromised broad versus constrictive by reassuring
that, although the scope of the ATS is not limited to violations of
international law recognized in the 18th century, "the judicial power should
be exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to
vigilant door-keeping," implying that Sosa is not meant to provide a free-
for-all litigation spectacle in U.S federal courts.96
2. Multinational Corporations as Defendants
a. Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum"
The Second Circuit recently interpreted Sosa to preclude
multinational corporations from an ATS claim. In Kiobel, a dozen Nigerian
plaintiffs claimed that Royal Dutch and two of its Shell Oil subsidiaries
worked with the Nigerian government to torture and extra-judicially
' 504 U.S. 655 (2004).





95 Id. at 662.
96 id.
9 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted.
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execute individuals protesting against the companies' oil exploration. 98
Judge Cabranes, writing for the majority, rejected corporate liability under
the ATS because it is not recognized under customary international law. He
wrote:
We hold, under the precedents of the Supreme Court and
our own Court over the past three decades, that in ATS
suits alleging violations of customary international law, the
scope of liability-who is liable for what-is determined
by customary international law itself. Because no
corporation has ever been subject to any form of liability
(whether civil or criminal) under the customary
international law of human rights, we hold that corporate
liability is not a discernible- much less universally
recognized-norm of customary international law that we
may apply pursuant to the ATS.99
The court in Kiobel has interpreted Sosa's jurisdictional restraint to
mean that not only is customary international law determinative of the
subject-matter of the dispute giving rise to a cause of action, but it is also
determinative against whom that cause of action may be brought. I believe
this determination is a misapplication of current jurisprudence. Sosa's
holding provides the guiding precedent that the applicability of the ATS in
granting jurisdiction to foreign plaintiffs is driven by the content of the
dispute, not in identifying who is or who is not a proper defendant under
the statute.100 Furthermore, Sosa's significance was that the violation of a
universally recognized norm abroad creates a cause of action under the
domestically governed ATS. An alien may obtain jurisdiction as a federal
question under the ATS when customary international law provides the
violation. The question of whether multinational corporations are liable
under customary international law begins with an analysis of the tort itself,
not the identity of the defendant entity.
The D.C. and Seventh Circuits also disagree with the Second
Circuit.'0 ' In Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., Judge Posner from
the Seventh Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's analysis of Sosa and
9
' Id. at 115.
99 Id. at 118.
.oo See generally William S. Dodge, Corporate Liability under Customarv International Law, 43
GEO.J.INT'LL. 1045 (2012).
1 Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 40-41 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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called their approach in Kiobel "an outlier." 02 Judge Posner determined
that Sosa simply did not decide that an ATS plaintiff was required to prove
a customary international norm providing for civil or criminal actions
against every category of ATS defendant.1 03 Posner further noted that, "If a
plaintiff had to show that civil liability for such violations was itself a norm
of international law, no claims under the Alien Tort Statute could ever be
successful, even claims against individuals: only the United States, as far as
we know, has a statute that provides a civil remedy for violations of
customary international law."1"
Similarly, the D.C Circuit Court of Appeals determined the issue of
corporate liability under the ATS in Doe v Exxon Mobile Corp. The Court
held that "neither the text, history, nor purpose of the ATS supports
corporate immunity for torts based on heinous conduct allegedly committed
by its agents in violation of the law of nations" and therefore concluded
that Exxon's objections to justiciability were "unpersuasive."o
b. Abdullah v. Pfizer, Inc. 06
The Second Circuit ruled that the prohibition on nonconsensual
medical experimentation on human beings constituted a universally
accepted norm of customary international law, and consequently an alleged
violation thereof fell within the jurisdiction of Alien Tort Statute.107 The
case arose because Pfizer had been testing new antibiotic drugs on children
and adults in Nigeria without their consent.'o After the district court
dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and forum non
conveniens, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded.o' The majority
stated clearly that because the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a violation of
customary international law and because Pfizer's profit from
experimentations on unwilling subjects in developing nations would result
in significant anti-American animus, the plaintiffs could claim a human
rights violation under the jurisdiction of the ATS.i1 o While there is not a
point of unanimous agreement, a growing consensus seems to be emerging
from judicial opinions and scholarship that multinational corporations have
responsibility for torts committed abroad.
102 Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017.
"m Id. at 1019.
'"0Id.
'0o Doe, 654 F.3d at 40.
106 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009).
11o Id. at 201.
.o. Id. at 199.
10 Id. at 170-180.
1Id. at 177.
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C. Environmental ATS Litigation
Achieving jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute is difficult for
any type of claim, but it has proven especially difficult for claims involving
environmental human rights. This de facto doctrine of avoidance is spelled
out in a few recent decisions concerning the impact that destructive
environmental practices have on human beings.
1. Environmental Abuse proves too vague to support ATS action
a. Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp."'
In 1991, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
became the first court presented with a class of plaintiffs claiming
jurisdiction under the ATS for human rights violations resulting from
flawed environmental practices.112 Amlon, an American corporation
specializing in the acquisition of metal residues, and its United Kingdom
affiliate, Wath, filed suit against FMC Corporation, a chemical
manufacturing company headquartered in Pennsylvania, over allegations
that FMC shipped hazardous material to the United Kingdom." 3 The
business affiliates functioned such that Amlon acquired various metal
residue and then transported this material to Wath for washing and
processing. FMC Corporation treated copper residue for reclamation
purposes, with the understanding that the material would be shipped back
to the U.K. free of impurities."s When a noxious smell revealed that
xylene," 6 hydrogen 7,117 and dioxin"' were found in large amounts, Amlon,
et al sued. The District Court examined The Resource Conservation and
.775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
112 Id.
1' Id. at 669.
114 Id. at 670.
115 Id.
116 Xylene is an EPA-listed hazardous waste. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Toxicological Profile for Xylene 1 (Aug. 1995).
' See Amlon, 775 F. Supp. at 670 ("7-hydrogen is an allegedly carcinogenic pesticide
intermediary").
''8 Id. Chlorinated phenols may form dioxin when exposed to heat and a catalyst. Tests on
laboratory animals indicate that dioxin is the most potent carcinogen known. Exposure to dioxin
can cause a serious skin disease called chloracne. Tests on laboratory animals also indicate that
exposure may result in a rare form of cancer called soft tissue sarcoma. See Michael Grough,
Dioxin: Perceptions, Estimates, and Measures, in PHANTOM RISK 249, 249-260 (Kenneth R.
Foster et al. eds., 1983).
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Recovery Act (RCRA)"9 as well as Principal 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration.120 The court dismissed the RCRA claim for lack of jurisdiction
on the ground that RCRA cannot be applied extraterritorially, as it would
be a violation of international comity. 12 1 In other words, since the waste
was entirely located within the territory of the U.K., a sovereign nation, it is
not the U.S. judiciary's business to enforce U.S laws outside the United
States.
Next, and most pertinent for this discussion, the court in Amlon
evaluated Stockholm Principle 21 regarding the violations of FMC Corp as
under customary international law, which would grant jurisdiction under
the ATS.122 The court found that although Principle 21 is applicable to this
case, it is not a source of international law that is specific or universal
enough to be considered a part of customary international law .123 The court
found Principle 21's responsibility measures to simply be a guiding tool
that countries should reach to achieve and that it could not be used to bind
the United States under customary international law. While the court
assessed what does not meet the standard for customary international law,
it did not say what does. Amlon did not result in the much-needed guidance
as to the standard to be met in order to sufficiently allege a violation of
customary international law on the grounds of human rights and the
environment.
b. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc124
Beanal is another notable case in which environmental human
rights victims sought redress in the United States via the ATS. The suit was
initiated by plaintiff Beanal, who alleged that a U.S. multinational
corporation, Freeport, was liable for cultural genocide, environmental torts,
and human rights abuses committed against his Amungme tribe in their
operations of mines in Indonesia. 125 Beanal, a resident of a small mining
village in Indonesia, alleged that, "Freeport's activities caused destruction,
1
' Id. at 669; 44 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1985).120 UN Conference on the Human Envt, Stockholm, Sweden, June 1972. Principle 21 states:
"States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction."
121 Amlon, 775 F. Supp. at 670. International Comity and the Act of State Doctrine are used
interchangeably.
122Id.
1' Id. at 722.
1 9 Beanal v. Freeport- McMoran, 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La 1997), af'd, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir.
1999).
12 Id. at 369.
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pollution, alteration, and contamination of natural waterways, as well as
surface and ground water sources; deforestation; destruction and alteration
of physical surroundings."1 26 He invoked three principles of international
law as the basis for obtaining jurisdiction in the United States under the
ATS: (1) the Polluter Pays Principle, 2 (2) the Precautionary
Principle,' 28and (3) the Proximity Principle. 29
The court rejected all three principles explaining that, "the
principles relied on by the Plaintiff, standing alone, do not constitute
international torts for which there is universal consensus in the
international community as to their binding status and their content."'" In
addition, the court further noted that the principles invoked by the plaintiff
pertained only to members of the international community and not to non-
state actors, such as the Freeport- McMoran Corporation. 13 1 The court
concluded that a treaty must exist to bind non-state actors and hold them
responsible for torts under international law.
Moreover, Beanal alleged that, through the environmental
destruction, Freeport-McMoran had committed cultural genocide to the
indigenous peoples inhabiting Tamika, Indonesia. The court rejected this
claim noting that, "genocide requires the destruction of a group, not a
culture." When claiming the destruction of culture by means of genocide,
the court reasoned that much more clarity is necessary and that Beanal's
complaint fell short of being sufficiently specific. In affirming the district
court's dismissal of the case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found Beanal's complaint to be general and vague and advised other courts
to operate with caution when adjudicating environmental claims under the
purview of another nation's laws.132 Like the decision in Amlon Metals, the
126 Id.
127 See PHILLIPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1:
FRAMEWORKS, STANDARDS, AND IMPLEMENTATION 213 -217 (1995) "This principle states that
the costs of pollution are to be borne by the polluter."
121 "Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation." See Rio Declaration Prin.15, UN Conference on Envt and Development, Rio De
Janeiro, June 3-14, 1992, available at
http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentlD=78&ArticlelD=1163
(last visited July 27, 2013).
129 The proximity principle suggests that hazardous waste should be disposed of in the state of its
creation, to the extent that such disposal is reasonable. Sands, supra note 127 at 217.
13o Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 384.
"' Id. at 370 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 601-602).
112 Id. "If Beanal in fact means that Freeport is destroying the Amungme culture, then he has
failed to state a claim for genocide. On the other hand, if Beanal intended to state that Freeport is
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Fifth Circuit warned of violating international comity by becoming
involved in the affairs of other sovereign nations.
The Beanal decision left the human rights community disappointed
and restless. The courts involved cautioned against finding an allegation of
environmental human rights as cognizable under customary international
law so as to grant jurisdiction under the ATS. The decision therefore left
the international community wondering if there even existed a threshold for
achieving the definiteness required to transform broad principles into
concrete legal structures. Beanal was seen as a squandered opportunity to
challenge ATS jurisprudence, scuttled due to poor planning and execution
despite a perfect set of facts, and created an enormous amount of frustration
among environmental human rights advocates.
c. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper, Corp.134
Echoing the Fifth Circuit's repudiation of general environmental
principles as sufficiently definite to attach customary international law
status, the Second Circuit rejected the use of the right to life, health, and
sustainable development, three fundamental principles of environmental
justice, to gain recognition under the ATS. In this case, the plaintiffs
brought suit against the corporation for instances of fatal lung disease
allegedly resulting from its copper mining, refining, and smelting
operations. 135 The Peruvian class action plaintiffs claimed that pollution
from the operations undertaken by the defendant violated their right to life,
health and sustainable development-principles that the plaintiffs argue
have risen to the level of customary international law. 136 The District Court
found that the plaintiffs' reliance on non-binding sources of international
law failed to meet the universally recognized standard set forth in ATS
jurisprudence. 3 7 The Second Circuit affirmed, stating that the right to life
and health, as far as a sustainable environment provided by the
government, is concerned 3 8 come from the "clear and unambiguous"
standard promulgated by the Filartiga Court.
committing acts with the intent to destroy the Amungme group, i.e. its members, then he has
failed to make this allegation sufficiently explicit."
.. See generally Jean Wu, Pursuing International Environmental Tort Claims under the ATCA:
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, 28 ECOLOGY L. Q. 487, 498 (2001).
11 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd, Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233
(2d Cir. 2003).
135 Flores, 414 F.3d 233.
1 Id. at 240.
11 Id. at 237.
" Id. at 244. Plaintiffs dropped sustainable development for review by the Second Circuit.
9 Id. at 255; Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876. See also Ulrich Beyerlin, Different Types of Norms in
International Environmental Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT'L ENV'L L. 425, 425-26
(Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).
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Flores is especially notable because it was the first case to directly
plead the link between human rights and the environment." Plaintiffs in
the case attempted to distinguish their case from the failed Amlon and
Beanal cases by emphasizing a human rights approach as their primary
basis for obtaining jurisdiction under the ATS.14 1 The Second Circuit did
not see distinguishable facts here and found that, "labels plaintiffs affix to
their claims cannot be determinative." 42
2. Using UNCLOS as Vehicle for International Recognition
a. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC 43
The foregoing case law has demonstrated the challenges of
recognizing environmental torts as customary international law and thus
affected the plaintiffs' ability to establish jurisdiction in a U.S. court for an
ATS claim alleging environmental harm. The Sarei decision, while
unsuccessful, has illuminated the first viable path to success for
environmental justice plaintiffs."
In Sarei, the defendant, Rio Tinto PLC, operates an international
mining group on the island of Bougainville, in Papua New Guinea.' 45 The
plaintiffs are current or former residents of the island of Bougainville.146
They brought this case under the ATS, alleging among other claims that the
intentional dumping of hazardous material into the community's river
system caused environmental destruction and harm to the island.147 In a
lawsuit substantively equivalent to the Flores case, the plaintiffs here
alleged that the actions of Rio Tinto PLC violated their right to life, health,
and sustainable development, and they stressed that these rights are
'4 See Natalie L. Bridgeman, Human Rights Litigation under the ATCA as a Proxy fbr
Environmental Claims, 6 YALE HUm. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 23 (2003).
141 Flores, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 510
'
4
2 Id. at 510-514.
" 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff'd in part, vacated in part (Sarei II), 456 F.3d 1069
(9th Cir. 2006), af'd in part,vacated in part, reversed in part (Sarei III), 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir.
2007), en banc rehearing granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007), heard on exhaustion of remedies
(Sarei IV), 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
'4 Christopher M. Kozoll, Poisoning the well: Persecution, the Environment, and Refugee Status,
15 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 271 (2004).
'4 Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
46Id.
'4 Id. at 1121-1126. For the purpose of this paper, I have omitted the plaintiffs' additional claims
accusing the defendants of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and racial discrimination
committed during a long-lasting internal conflict in Papua New Guinea in which many died.
These jus cogens violations are still pending before the Ninth Circuit.
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sufficiently specific and universally recognized to meet the Sosa
standard. 4 8 Counsel for the plaintiffs referred to the same international
documents used by the plaintiffs in Flores.'49 However, in Sarei, the
plaintiffs also claimed that the intentional dumping of toxic waste violated
two provisions of the United Nations Convention on Law and the Sea
(UNCLOS)."
The District Court refused to give merit to the plaintiffs' claims
emanating from violations of right to life, health, and sustainable
development, ruling that that they were insufficient in definiteness to rise to
the level of customary international law."' In fact, the District Court,
eventually affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, went one step further. It
pronounced that even if the right to life and health were a part of customary
international law, harm to the environment as the catalyst for the
deprivation of these broad rights is certainly not a specific, universal, and
obligatory norm. 52 In regards to the sustainable development claim, the
courts refused to accept the international documents as obligatory
instruments that could bind the United States to their declarations.'53
While the decision failed to negotiate access to environmental
justice by way of international human rights in U.S federal courts, the
District Court held that the allegations of UNCLOS violations met the
requirements of Sosa.'54 The Ninth Circuit affirmed on this count and held
that while the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, the binding legal
instrument is specific enough in its provisions, obligatory among the 162
nations party to it, and universally recognized as customary international
law.' This revelation has provided the international environmental justice
community and future plaintiffs with strategies to create a sufficient nexus
between environmental human rights damages and access to redress.
'" Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
'49 Plaintiffs referred to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the
American Convention on Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, and the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Id. at 1156.
"-o Id. at 1160. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, entered into force November 16, 1994,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. Widely regarded as the "Constitution of the
Sea," UNCLOS has been ratified by 162 countries. Plaintiffs cited Article 194, which says,
"states take all measures ... that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the
marine environment that involves hazards to human health, living resources and marine life
through the introduction of substances into the marine environment," and Article 207 which states
that, "States adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine
environment caused by land-based sources."




Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 1078.
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Unfortunately, even though a cognizable claim was found in the
UNCLOS violations, the Ninth Circuit ultimately dismissed the case under
the ATS due to international comity concerns similar to those in Amlon
Metals.156 The Court sitting en banc found the actions of Rio Tinto PLC to
be closely related to the actions of the nation of Papua New Guinea, and
not within the purview of the United States' judiciary.s This facet of the
case underscores the procedural hurdles to obtaining jurisdiction under the
ATS. It seems that even when all of the puzzle pieces fit together
convincingly, environmental justice via the ATS remains an illusion.
b. Environmental Victims Deserve a Remedy
After analyzing the seemingly infinite obstacles to achieving
jurisdiction under the ATS, one might consider using an established norm
of customary international law as a route to circumvent these barriers. The
Ninth Circuit Court provided the possibility of such recovery in a short
section of its opinion in Sarei.58 The Court distinguished the UNCLOS
claims from the remaining claims the plaintiffs brought, which included
violations of the laws of war and racial discrimination.1s' After it was
determined that the prudential interests of international comity preempted
the UNCLOS claims, the court implicitly suggested that had the plaintiffs
asserted what the Court defined as "jus cogens"'6 0 offenses of racial
discrimination and violations of war, the result of dismissal would have
been different because these very serious offenses are not trumped by
prudential concerns.16 ' Asserting existing jus cogens offenses as a route to
environmental justice, in lieu of the environmental atrocities as jus cogens
violations themselves, is not the answer.
For indigenous communities like the Kichwa of Ecuador, the
Korubo and Urarina of Peru, and the Amungme Tribe of Indonesia, the
' Id. at 1193. Previously, the court had declined to dismiss on the basis of the forum non
conveniens doctrine after deeming that private interests favor retaining jurisdiction and that public
interests were neutral. Id. at 1175.
" Id. at 1176-77.
1-5 Id. at 1165-72.
'59 Id. at 1172.
0 Markus Petsche, Jus Cogens as a Vision Of The International Legal Order, 29 PENN ST. INT'L
L. REV. 233,258 (2010) (Jus cogens is based on the idea that the international legal system
recognizes, or should recognize, a set of fundamental values.").
' Sarei H, 456 F.3d at 1165-75. "Only the other claims assert.jus cogens violations that form the
least controversial core of modern day ATCA jurisdiction." Sarei 111,487 F.3d 1193, en banc
hearing granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007) ("A different outcome would only have been
possible if the invoked UNCLOS norms were part of jus cogens.").
Fall 2013 37
THE DARTMOUTH LAW JOURNAL
environment is the lynchpin of posterity. The indigenous peoples involved
in these cases are not the only victims here. Future generations of
indigenous peoples, if in existence at all, are relegated to adapting to a new
way of life and compromising their cultural heritage. Over time, this
effectively results in the extinction of the tribes, or at least the way of life
that they know. Obtaining the equitable relief necessary to fix this threat of
eradication must, then, be found in environmental claims themselves, and
financial recovery must go to environmental remediation for the sake of the
indigenous identity.
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of UNCLOS will be helpful for
future environmental victims. The concepts of the right to life, to health,
and sustainable development are amorphous indeed, and the instruments
that contain such rights are only binding, if at all, for the nations who
voluntarily assent to be bound by them. The Ninth Circuit's finding of
sufficient definiteness in UNCLOS violations suggests that another court,
with the right set of facts, could find pollution on the level of severity akin
to that of the Ecuadorian plaintiffs, worthy of customary international law
status via UNCLOS.
V. CONNECTING THE DOTS: RECOVERY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL TORT
PLAINTIFFS
A. Achieving Jurisdiction via the Alien Tort Statute
To prevail in an environmental ATCA claim, a plaintiff must: (1)
overcome the motion to dismiss on forum grounds, and (2) prove that the
defendant's actions and the resulting damage are in violation of, "Norms of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity "comparable to the 18th century paradigms." 162 that the Sosa
Court required.
1. Clearing the Sosa Hurdle
Of the three prongs of the Sosa test,163 specificity is the primary
hurdle in every environmental ATS claim. Traditionally, the consensus
among the circuits has insisted that the "right to life" and the "right to
health" are vague concepts that do not meet the standards set in Sosa.64 In
Flores, for example, the Second Circuit stated that the rights to life and to
162 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
a Amlon, 775 F. Supp. 668; Beanal, 969 F. Supp. 362; Flores, 253 F. Supp. 2d 510.
1 Sarah M. Morris, Intersection Of Equal And Environmental Protection: A New Direction for
Environmental Alien Tort Claims After Sarei and Sosa, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 275
(2009).
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health are too indeterminate to constitute a cause of action under the
AS165ATS.is
Transcending this interpretation and including environmental
human rights violations is, for the first time, a conceivable path. Two years
after Flores, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California held that, "The limits of a norm need not be defined with
particularity to be actionable; rather, the norm need only be so defined that
the particular acts upon which a claim is based certainly fall within the
bounds of the norm." 66 In Doe v. Qi, that court stated, "The fact that there
may be doubt at the margins-a fact that inheres in any definition-does
not negate the essence and application of that definition in clear cases." 67
The dispute among the circuits concerning what exact parameters should be
assessed to customary international law status is a misinterpretation of
Sosa.iss
Furthermore, the court also described how to determine what
actions should be excluded as an international norm, holding that, "The
actions alleged should be compared with actions that international
adjudicatory bodies have found to be proscribed by the norm in
question."l69 The Doe Court gave deference to decisions by institutions
such as the Human Rights' Committee, the European Court of Human
Rights, and the African Commission on Human Rights to elucidate
international consensus.
Facts comparable to the Chevron/Ecuador case demonstrate a level
of specificity that U.S. courts should regard as adequate. The evidence of
the harmful actions taken by the defendants, or actions they knowingly
failed to take, is clear and overwhelming. 170 Their operations in Ecuador
were carried out in a tortious manner for thirty years, resulting in relentless
environmental decay. The evidence shows that there were responsible
disposal methods available and that Texaco utilized them in its United
States operations but not in Ecuador.171 Evidence also shows that even after
the first action was filed against Texaco in 1993, no sincere remediation
efforts were made and the very same destructive practices persisted.'72 The
"totality of the circumstances" evaluation used in Doe is the most equitable
' Flores, 414 F.3d at 247.
'66 Doe v. Qi, 349 F.Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
' Id. at 1266.
'6 Sosa, 504 U.S. 655; 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
'6' Doe, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1261-62.
1o See Paul M. Barrett, Amazon Crusader. Chevron Pest. Fraud?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK
(Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/ 11_12/b4220056636512.htm.
1 Aguinda v Texaco, Inc. 945 F.Supp. 625 (1996).
1' Id. at 627.
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approach possible and should be used in evaluating the Chevron/Ecuador
case as well. To refuse to hear a case on its merits in the face of blatant
violations and misconduct committed abroad effectively vitiates the vision
and intent of the ATS.173
The universal component required under the Sosa analysis is the
least contentious element in ATS controversy. Something is not customary
international law if it is not a standard to which the vast majority of
countries adhere. Both the Filartiga and Sosa cases, from which the
foundational principles of ATS analysis emanate, declare that customary
international law is an evolving body of law that includes norms that
emerge when "conduct, or the conscious abstention from certain conduct,
of states ... becomes in some measure a part of the international legal
order."" Very simply stated by a note from the Third Restatement of the
Law of Foreign Relations of the United States, "practice builds law."'
The conduct of Chevron in Ecuador is universally condemned. 76
There is well -established, universal consensus that the rights of sovereignty
and the ability to exploit one's own natural resources exist in every nation.
When the ability to capture those resources is lost due to the tortious
conduct of another, international consensus that a remedy should be
afforded to such victims exists.
Moreover, it is universally agreed that a significant purpose of the
ATS was to "ensure that the United States complied with its obligations
under international law by providing redress for certain violations of the
law of nations.""7 The obligatory element of the Sosa framework is a
qualifier of the specificity requirement and a limitation on the universal
component. The general rule is that to be recognized as customary
international law, the violations committed must present a binding
obligation on the U.S.'"8 Concepts that are not of binding character are
determined not sufficiently specific, and even if the concepts are
universally condemned, they are not enough to rise to the level of
customary international law. I, along with others, find strict adherence to a
narrow definition of "obligatory" antiquated and not in line with the intent
of the ATS.179 The Second Circuit in Abdullah v Pfizer, Inc.so determined
1 Id.
' HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,
MORALS 224 (2008).
" RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 102.
176 Aguinda III, 2012 WL 7745068.
m Bradley & Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997).
1 Sosa, 504 U.S. at 660.
"7 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 177, at 330-331. The authors attack the obligatory element
on the grounds that "The modern position claim that CIL is to be applied as federal common law
thus compensates for the abstinence of the United States vis-a-vis ratification of international
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that medical experimentation on persons without their consent is
universally censured, and while the Court used the Nuremberg trials in
Germany only as persuasive material, their focus was the anti-American
animus that would abound if we failed to hold Pfizer accountable.
Moreover, requiring a binding document to obligate U.S. courts to
establish customary international law is counterintuitive to the ATS. If it
were meant to be a requirement, the statute would only have extended
jurisdiction for torts committed in violation of a U.S. treaty with no
mention of those committed in violation of the law of nations. Binding
documents are produced from a legislative process in which complex
political systems have to work in tandem to agree on something. Requiring
that a violation either be enumerated in a binding document to which the
U.S. assents or the decision of a court the U.S. chooses to validate,
presupposes that the legislative branch is a corollary of the judicial branch,
which it is not."s' The two are separate branches of government designed to
keep a "check" on one another. The ATS is a jurisdictional statute, and the
question of what constitutes customary international law under the statute
is a legal question. Thus, by logical extension, allowing the defiance of
environmental human rights' policy by American legislators to dictate the
parameters of the ATS is logically flawed. The obligatory requirement is a
technicality and should only be used as a persuasive factor-not as a
requirement.
2. Using the UNCLOS analysis from Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC
The bane of the Kichwa in Ecuador was thirty years of mass
pollution to the environment, resulting in widespread illness and resource
degradation. 82 Significant funds will be necessary to repair the
environment to a livable habitat. The Ninth Circuit's recognition of
UNCLOS provisions in Sarei, as customary international law, opened the
door to recovery for environmental human rights victims.183
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's determination that
the two provisions of UNCLOS had risen to the level of an international
norm, primarily because of the wide acceptance and adherence by the
human rights treaties. It permits federal courts to accomplish through the back door of CIL what
the political branches have prohibited through the front door of treaties."
"s 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16126 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005.)
181 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitutional
Doctrine, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 67 (1988).
182 Id.
"" Sarei II, 456 F.3d 1069.
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nations of the world to the prohibition of willful marine pollution." This
signals a very important benchmark in the evolution of ATS jurisprudence
and is enormously important for environmental human rights plaintiffs.
What this effectively does is recognize that international norms exist
independently of the obligatory requirement under Sosa. Until this case, no
treaty provision rose to the level of binding customary international law for
ATS purposes without ratification by the United States government. This
decision establishes the precedent that specific violations of universally
recognized pollution standards are actionable under the ATS.
B. Dispelling the Act of State Doctrine
The final hurdle any environmental plaintiff must overcome is the
Act of State Doctrine. This doctrine provides that a nation is sovereign
within its own borders, and its domestic actions may not be questioned in
the courts of another nation.s 5 As seen in the Sarei decision, even if the
requirements of customary international law are met, U.S. federal courts
have established a precedent of non-intervention on matters that straddle
foreign affairs and the law. The threshold inquiry is the degree of interplay
between the government in which the tort takes place and the tortfeasors. If
the developing nation's government is knowingly contributing and
allowing the cause of the damages, U.S. courts will very likely determine
that the dispute belongs within the courts of that nation.
Although not required under international legal principles,186 the
doctrine aims both to protect other nations' sovereignty by intervention
from the U.S. and to protect the U.S. Executive's broad foreign affairs
powers from being usurped by a decision issued from the judiciary."' If a
federal court made a determination of law that ran afoul of the executive's
foreign policy, the authority of the executive would be diminished.
In 1964, the Supreme Court upheld the Act of State Doctrine to
the chagrin of Congress and American investors in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v Sabbatino. " In that case, the Court maintained that the Act of State
Doctrine barred recovery for American investors in Cuba's sugar
production after the government nationalized the sugar industry and refused
a UNCLOS, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (1982).
a Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
116 Neither customary international law nor treaty law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987). The Restatement maintains that
a domestic court possessing adjudicatory jurisdiction may exercise that jurisdiction if it is
reasonable to do so. It asserts that the principle of reasonableness is based on customary
international law.
18 See, Deborah Azar, Simplifying The Prophecy Of Justiciability In Cases Concerning Foreign
Affairs: A Political Act Of State Question, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 471 (2010).
188 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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to compensate the shareholders.' The Court held that Cuba's sovereign
right to control its domestic affairs is beyond the scope of the federal
judiciary's adjudicative authority." Congress responded with the
Hickenlooper Amendment,"' which balances the interests of foreign affairs
and justice by allowing the United States Executive to decide, on a case-by-
case basis, when the Court should invoke the doctrine. 92 The President of
the U.S. will invoke the doctrine when intervention in such affairs does not
belong in the purview of the judicial branch.
In Sarei, the Rio Tinto company's operations were found to be
attributable to the sovereign Papua New Guinea government due to the
state-sanctioned violence and torture of opposition to the company.1 93 Even
though the Sosa elements were met, the Act of State Doctrine precluded the
extension of jurisdiction for prudential reasons. In contrast, plaintiffs in the
Chevron/Ecuador litigation would likely not face preclusion under doctrine.
The Ecuadorian Government fully supports its indigenous peoples and
condemns the actions of Chevron. The Ecuadorian government's
involvement with Chevron is no longer a matter of state policy, and
intervention by a U.S. adjudicative body would pose no threat to the
foreign affairs' policy of the U.S.
Chevron has argued that because Ecuador's oil and natural gas
industry is nationalized, there is a sufficient connection between the actions
of Chevron and the Ecuadorian Government, thus transforming the dispute
into a political question under the Act of State doctrine. This argument is
flawed. For the Act of State Doctrine to apply, it must be shown that the
government of Ecuador either affirmatively took steps to suppress justice,
as in the case of Sarei, or entirely acquiesced. With a favorable judgment in
Ecuador and the support of that nation to enforce it, neither is present.
VI. CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs affected by the tortious conduct of the Chevron
Corporation are entitled to a remedy. Unfortunately, by the time a remedy
materializes, it may be too late to save their cultural lands and ensure the
continuation of their indigenous identity. For more than twenty years, the
'" Id. at 410.
"0 Id. at 417.
" 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (1964).
192 See, Frances X. Hogan, The Hickenlooper Amendments: Peru's Seizure of International
Petroleum Company As a Test Case, 11 B.C. L. REV. 77 (1969).
" Sarei I, 456 F.3d at 1165.
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plaintiffs have journeyed through one procedural hoop after another, and it
appears that there is no end in sight.
For future plaintiffs of environmental human rights violations, U.S.
federal courts should use the Chevron litigation as a motivator to apply the
Alien Tort Statute as it was intended: as a deterrent to such convoluted,
expensive, and time-consuming litigation. Accountability measures should
be imposed on multinational corporations' actions abroad to protect
indigenous communities from tortious environmental misconduct occurring
on a level that will cause great damage to their lands and people. Under the
Alien Tort Statute, such measures have existed for more than two centuries
to provide relief from extrajudicial murder, medical experimentations on
non-consenting persons, torture, genocide, and other offenses. With the
favorable determination from the Ninth Circuit that UNCLOS pollution
provisions rise to the level of customary international law, the natural
evolution of ATS jurisprudence includes human rights violations resulting
from tortious environmental degradation.
